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H. DoiLE JEOPARDY
United States v. Council
973 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1992)
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents a
person from being tried for the same crime twice. 362 While a defendant
may not be retried at all after being acquitted by a jury,363 the government
may appeal a judicially-delivered acquittal under U.S.C. section 3731.16
If a reviewing court determines that the acquittal functions as a dismissal,
then double jeopardy does not bar the reprosecution of the defendant on
the same counts. 365 Similarly, a mistrial may bar a subsequent retrial on
the charges, depending on which party requested the mistrial andwhether
the mistrial was manifestly necessary.
366
In United States v. Council,367 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered the issue of whether a defendant may be
retried after a trial court entered a judgment of acquittal as a sanction
for a prosecutorial Rule 16 violation. The Fourth Circuit also decided
whether a mistrial, urged by the prosecutor, bars the retrial of the
defendant on those counts. Finally, in an order entered after a rehearing
of the case, the Fourth Circuit stated that the government must preserve
an objection to the District Court's acquittal in order to appeal and
reprosecute a defendant.
In Council, federal agents arrested the defendant, Robert Council,
Jr., on federal weapons charges. Council had learned that his brother-in-
law, Clarence, had been arrested for a crime involving hand grenades.
Council asked Clarence's wife if Clarence had any other weapons at
Clarence's house, and then Council removed the .ones that he found.
Council told Clarence's wife that he was moving the weapons, which
included hand grenades and a mine, for the protection of Council's
grandchildren who lived in the area. Council placed the weapons behind
his house and attempted to call a deputy sheriff to remove the weapons
362. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person shall be "subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
363. See United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980) (stating that acquittals are
given special weight in double jeopardy jurisprudence); Ball v. United States 163 U.S. 662 (1896)
(stating that defendant may not be retried after jury acquittal).
364. See 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988). The section states that the United States may appeal a
final decision of a district court dismissing an indictment or information except where the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars a retrial of the defendant. Id.
365. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977) (stating that
acquittals and dismissals are not to be determined by their label, but by their substance).
366. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957) (stating that defendant should
not be subjected to reprosecution if prosecutor or judge discontinues trial, but double jeopardy
does not bar reprosecution if trial's completion is impossible).
367. 973 F.2d 251, amended, 1992 U.S. App LEXIS 28890 (4th Cir. 1992).
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from his house. Before the deputy sheriff could pick up the weapons,
federal agents came to Council's house and he showed the agents where
he had placed the weapons.
Both Council and Clarence were indicted by a grand jury. Council
was indicted on five counts: one count of receiving with intent to convert
stolen property belonging to the United States, three counts of knowingly
receiving and possessing unregistered firearms, and one count of being an
accessory after the fact to Clarence's crimes. Council pled not guilty to
all of the counts and requested a jury trial.
During the trial, the government introduced evidence through a gov-
ernment witness that Council had stated that he had taken the weapons
in order to assist Clarence. The government had not provided this statement
to the defendant as required by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.368 The court ruled that the statement was relevant to the counts
of knowingly receiving stolen property and accessory after the fact, counts
eight and twelve. The court suggested a mistrial as to those two counts.
The government, however, felt that a mistrial would bar a reprosecution
of the counts due to double jeopardy and offered to dismiss counts eight
and twelve. The district court, using the discretion given to the court as
a remedy for Rule 16 violations, 369 decided that it would grant the
defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of the govern-
ment's case on counts eight and twelve. The government did not protest
or note an exception to the entry of the acquittal.
The court dismissed one count because of multiplicity and submitted
two counts, counts nine and eleven, to the jury. Both of the counts dealt
with the knowing possession of unregistered weapons. The government
did not need to show that Council knew that the weapons were unregis-
tered, but only that Council knew that he possessed the weapons. The
court accordingly instructed the jury that an action done "knowingly"
was an action done voluntarily and intentionally. In neither the court's
instructions to the jury nor the parties' closing arguments was motive
mentioned as to counts nine and eleven.
Nevertheless, during deliberations the jury foreman sent a note to the
court asking a definition of "knowingly." The court repeated the definition
given in the jury instructions. Later, the jury foreman sent another note
which seemed to indicate that the jury had confused the issue of Council's
motive in moving the weapons with the issue of Council's knowledge that
he had possessed the weapons. The court noted that motive was irrelevant
368. FED. R. Cams. P. 16(a)(1)(a). The rule states that: "The government shall also disclose
to the defendant the substance of any other relevant oral statement made by the defendant
whether before or after arrest in response to interrogation by any person then known by the
defendant to be a government agent if the government intends to use that statement at trial."
Id.
369. FED. R. Cams. P. 16(d)(2). The rule states that: "If at any time during the course of
the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with
this rule, the court may... enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." Id.
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to counts nine and eleven, and suggested that a new instruction explaining
the issue of volition would enable the jury to deliberate correctly. The
prosecutor suggested that the court should declare a mistrial. Over Coun-
cil's objections, the court declared a mistrial as to counts nine and eleven.
The court stated that it had granted the mistrial in fairness to both sides
because the court had precluded the development of the trial and created
a manifest necessity for the mistrial.
The government sought to reprosecute on counts eight, nine, eleven,
and twelve. Council moved to dismiss all of the counts on double jeopardy
grounds. The court determined that double jeopardy did not bar the
reprosecution of Council on any of the counts. Council then appealed the
decision to the Fourth Circuit.
In deciding Council's appeal, the Fourth Circuit first analyzed counts
eight and twelve, the counts on which the district court entered a judgment
of acquittal because of the Rule 16 violations. The majority began by
determining whether the judgment of acquittal was, in fact, an acquittal,
or if it was a dismissal. The government conceded that if Council actually
had been acquitted double jeopardy would bar his reprosecution. However,
the government contended that the judgment of acquittal functioned as a
dismissal, and therefore Council could be retried on the counts. The
Supreme Court propounded this theory in United States v. Martin Linen
Supply Co.,370 in which the Court stated that any decision, whether called
a dismissal or an acquittal, could be an acquittal for double jeopardy
purposes if and only if the decision represented a resolution of the factual
elements of the crime.171 Consequently, the substance of a court's decision,
and not the label attached to the decision, will determine whether the
government may retry a defendant on the same charge. The Fourth Circuit
majority noted that, in applying this doctrine, the circuits have found that
actions called "dismissals" were in fact acquittals, 372 and that actions
styled "acquittals" were actually dismissals.
37 3
Based on the Martin Linen test, the majority in Council held that the
trial court's judgment was actually a dismissal. The majority based this
decision on the trial judge's use of the acquittal as a sanction for the
Rule 16 violation, instead of basing the acquittal on the facts as developed
at trial. Consequently, there was no resolution of the factual elements of
the charged offense, and the acquittal functioned as a dismissal.
After determining that there had been no acquittal of Council, the
majority determined that the government could reprosecute Council on
370. 430 U.S. 564 (1977).
371. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977).
372. See United States v. Hospital Monteflores, Inc., 575 F.2d 332, 333 n.1 (Ist Cir. 1978)
(holding that "dismissal" was acquittal because district court resolved factual elements of case).
373. See United States v. Appawoo, 553 F.2d 1242, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that
"acquittal" was dismissal because district court made decision based on information not developed
at trial, therefore there was no resolution of factual elements of case).
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counts eight and twelve. Basing its decision on Lee v. United States,
37 4
the majority noted that in both Lee and Council the prosecutor's miscon-
duct, which caused the mistrial, was simply from negligence and not from
purposeful overreaching. The majority noted that in Oregon v. Kennedy,
375
the Supreme Court held that double jeopardy only could be a bar to
retrial in dismissals that resulted from governmental conduct meant to
provoke the defendant into seeking a mistrial.176 The majority concluded
that the trial court's reinstatement of counts eight and twelve showed that
the prosecution had no malicious intent in the Rule 16 violation, and
therefore double jeopardy did not bar Council's reprosecution.
Judge Hall, dissenting, analyzed counts eight and twelve differently,
concluding that Council could not constitutionally be retried. The dissent
noted that trial courts have discretion as to the sanction for Rule 16
violations. The trial court has the ability to enter a dismissal with prejudice,
which, like an acquittal, will bar a subsequent reprosecution. The dissent
first took issue with the majority's characterization of the acquittal as a
dismissal, then disagreed with the majority's determination of the double
jeopardy issue, noting that the cases relied upon by the majority did not
support the position for which the majority used them.
Section 3731 of the United States Code allows the government to
appeal the dismissal of an indictment, except when double jeopardy bars
a reprosecution.37 The dissent stated that the cases relied upon by the
majority only addressed the issue of appealability of an acquittal or a
dismissal. The cases did not support the majority's position that an
acquittal which is not appealed can be considered to be a dismissal and
thus reprosecuted. The dissent pointed out that the government never
appealed the trial judge's determination that the judgment of acquittal
should be entered. In fact, the government supported the court's decision.
Consequently, the dissent rejected the majority's reliance on Martin Linen
and Lee, and held that the final acquittal on the books in the trial court
barred the reprosecution of Council.
Both the majority and dissent held that double jeopardy barred the
reprosecution of Council on counts nine and eleven. The trial court
initiated the mistrial because of the jury's improper consideration of
motive. The trial court stated that the mistrial was manifestly necessary,
and was granted in fairness to both the defendant and the prosecution.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed.
If a trial judge declares a mistrial, the government may not reprosecute
unless the mistrial was manifestly necessary. Although Council objected
to the court's evidentiary rulings, Council never claimed that the court's
decisions amounted to reversible error or that the mistrial was necessary.
374. 432 U.S. 23 (1977).
375. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
376. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).
377. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988).
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The government could not claim that the jury instructions were in error
because the government had submitted the instructions which were used
in the trial. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit determined that the trial
court's mere statement that fairness to the defendant was a consideration
in the mistrial was not a sufficient showing that the mistrial was a manifest
necessity. As a result, double jeopardy precluded Council from being
retried on counts nine and eleven.
After the Council decision was handed down by the Fourth Circuit,
Council petitioned for rehearing, asserting that the district court lacked
jurisdiction to reinstate counts eight and twelve. Council stated that the
district court lacked jurisdiction because the government did not appeal
from the entry of judgments of acquittal on the two counts. However,
Council had not raised this aspect of the case in the original proceeding
before the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit requested supplemental briefs from the parties for
the rehearing. In the government's brief, the government acknowledged
that its failure to preserve an objection to the trial court's entry of an
acquittal to the two counts barred further prosecution of Council on those
counts. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit entered an order remanding the
case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the prosecution
against Council on all counts.
The majority in Council applied the section 3731 appealability test to
a situation in which appealability was not an issue. Courts have allowed
substantial leeway to government appeals of decisions of acquittal, espe-
cially if the trial court will not have to engage in further factfinding. 378
However, the Supreme Court has granted this leeway only for appeals of
judgments of acquittals, not for the reprosecution of defendants after
acquittals. As the dissent in Council noted, if the government had appealed
Council's acquittal, double jeopardy would not have barred the review of
the court's decision. 379 However, the majority's use of precedent which
was based on section 3731 permitted the Fourth Circuit to allow Council's
reprosecution, even though a correct application of double jeopardy case
law would not have produced this result.
Fortunately, the Fourth Circuit appears to have acknowledged this
mistake and rectified it by granting a rehearing and entering an order
dismissing the prosecution against Council. By barring reprosecution of a
judicially-acquitted defendant in the absence of an appeal by the govern-
ment, the Fourth Circuit maintained the necessity of a government appeal
under section 3731 in order to retry a defendant. However, the majority
opinion in Council must still be read carefully, as it incorrectly analyzes
the double jeopardy issues involved in the case.
378. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 270-71 (1978) (allowing government to
appeal decision where judgment of acquittal follows guilty verdict because no further factual
proceedings will be needed, as finding of guilt may be reinstated).
379. United States v. Council, 973 F.2d 251, 258, amended, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 28890
(4th Cir. 1992).
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United States v. McHan
966 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1992)
One of the protections that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment provides to criminal defendants is the right not to be prose-
cuted twice for the same offense.8 0 Courts have held that this protection
prohibits prosecutors from dividing one offense into two charges 381 and
from prosecuting defendants for both greater and lesser included offenses
in consecutive trials.382 In most cases, the Double Jeopardy Clause also
prohibits the government from using conduct for which the government
already has prosecuted the defendant as a necessary element of a second
criminal prosecution.383
Despite these general rules, double jeopardy jurisprudence is riddled
with exceptions and complexities. 84 In recent years, the United States
Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit have struggled in applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to prose-
cutions for "multilayered" criminal conduct. Multilayered conduct is
conduct composed of multiple acts that are distant from one another in
space and/or time. Multilayered criminal conduct often underlies prose-
cutions for conspiracies, continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) offenses,
and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) offenses.
385
In the context of prosecutions for multilayered criminal conduct, the
Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit already have recognized some
exceptions to traditional judicial rules concerning double jeopardy. For
example, in a 1991 RICO prosecution case, United States v. Arnoldt,
86
the Fourth Circuit carved out an exception to the general bar against
subsequent prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses.387 In
RICO cases, the prosecutor must prove that the defendant committed two
or more acts constituting a pattern of racketeering.8 The Fourth Circuit
380. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
381. See United States v. MacDougall, 790 F.2d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
Double Jeopardy Clause forbids division of single conspiracy into multiple violations of conspiracy
statute).
382. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169-70 (1977) (holding that conviction for joyriding,
lesser included offense, barred prosecution for auto theft based on same incident).
383. See Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990) (holding that Fifth Amendment barred
prosecution for manslaughter because manslaughter case would necessarily include proof of
conduct for which government already had prosecuted defendant).
384. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1977) (plurality opinion) (discussing
recognized exceptions to rigid double jeopardy protection).
385. See United States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120, 1126 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that RICO
and CCE statutes are targeted at multilayered criminal conduct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666
(1992).
386. 947 F.2d 1120 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992).
387. See Arnoldt, 947 F.2d at 1127 (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause does not foreclose
successive prosecutions for predicate offense and RICO violation).
388. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
1993]
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concluded in Arnoldt that the defendant's prior convictions for some
predicate acts did not bar the RICO prosecution.3
9
Recently, in United States v. McHan,390 the Fourth Circuit addressed
two double jeopardy issues. The first issue the court examined was whether
the conspiracy charge against the defendant, McHan, was the "same
offense" for double jeopardy purposes as a conspiracy to which the
defendant had pled guilty in a prior prosecution. The Fourth Circuit then
considered whether the Fifth Amendment permitted the government to use
the conspiracy to which the defendant had pled guilty as an element of a
CCE charge.
In McHan, the United States charged Charles William McHan with
various substantive drug offenses, tax evasion, conspiracy to distribute
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. section 846, and a CCE offense in
violation of 21 U.S.C. section 848. The government based the CCE charge
on allegations of marijuana importation, possession, and distribution from
1984-1988. McHan and the government formulated a plea agreement, but
the parties never finalized the bargain because the government insisted
that McHan's wife forfeit certain property and she refused to do so.
McHan's attorneys then moved to dismiss the conspiracy and CCE counts
on the grounds that these charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment. McHan moved pro se to dismiss the entire indict-
ment on the same grounds.
McHan's claim of a double jeopardy violation stemmed from the fact
that he had pled guilty, in an earlier prosecution, to a drug conspiracy
occurring from March to May of 1988. McHan argued that the 1988
conspiracy to which he had pled guilty was really part of the 1984-1986
conspiracy charged in the case at bar. Thus, the conspiracy count exposed
McHan to a second prosecution for a single conspiracy offense.
McHan also argued that if the government were to prosecute him for
the CCE offense after having already prosecuted him for the 1988 con-
spiracy, the CCE prosecution would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.
McHan pointed out that the Supreme Court already had decided, in Jeffers
v. United States,391 that 21 U.S.C. section 846 is a lesser included offense
of 21 U.S.C. section 848.392 Because the government had already prosecuted
McHan under 21 U.S.C. section 846 for the 1988 conspiracy, McHan
argued that the government could not prosecute him for the CCE under
21 U.S.C. section 848 because that would expose him to subsequent
prosecutions for greater and lesser included offenses in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
389. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d at 1127 (permitting government to prosecute defendant although
prima facie case included as element of proof some racketeering offenses for which government
had already convicted defendant).
390. 966 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1992).
391. 432 U.S. 137, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 880 (1977).
392. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 146 (1977).
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Alternatively, McHan argued that the 1988 conspiracy would constitute
one of the predicate acts that the government must prove to demonstrate
a continuing course of conduct-an essential element of a CCE offense.
Because the government already had convicted McHan for the 1988 con-
spiracy, conduct for which the government already had prosecuted McHan
would constitute one of the predicate acts of the CCE charge. Therefore,
McHan argued that the court should dismiss the CCE charge.
The United States District Court for the Western District North
Carolina denied McHan's motion to dismiss. The district court heard
testimony from McHan's alleged co-conspirators and concluded, based on
evidence concerning the nature, scope, and time frames of the 1988 and
1984-1986 conspiracies, that the conspiracies were separate offenses. The
district court also held that the use of the 1988 conspiracy as an element
of the CCE charge did not constitute double jeopardy.
The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal from the district court's
denial of his motion to dismiss the conspiracy and CCE counts. On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit first considered McHan's claim that the 1988 and 1984-
1986 conspiracies were one continuing conspiracy. The Fourth Circuit
noted that according to North Carolina v. Pearce and United States v.
MacDougall, the division of a single conspiracy into multiple counts
violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
393
The Fourth Circuit relied on United States v. Ragins394 in determining
whether or not the conspiracies were separate offenses. Ragins states that
courts should examine the degree of overlap in the alleged conspiracies'
time periods, locations, participants, and activities (nature and scope), as
well as which statutes the conspiracies violated 93 The Fourth Circuit in
McHan noted that triers of fact should apply these factors flexibly. The
Fourth Circuit in McHan also stated that courts may consider other factors
and that the law does not require any specific level of overlap to support
a finding that two charges constitute one offense.
Based on the trial testimony and the indictments, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the conspiracies did involve several of the same partici-
pants and that both conspiracies concerned drug activities in Texas and
North Carolina. However, the earlier conspiracy involved more participants
and concerned activities in a broader geographic area. The court also
construed the testimony of McHan's co-conspirators to mean that there
had been a true break in activities between 1986 and 1988. Based on these
findings, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court's finding that there
were two separate conspiracies was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly,
the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of the motion to
dismiss the conspiracy count.
393. See 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (forbidding division of single conspiracy into multiple
violations of conspiracy statute); 790 F.2d 1135, 1144 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that government
may not divide one conspiracy into multiple counts).
394. 840 F.2d 1184 (4th Cir. 1988).
395. United States v. Ragins, 840 F.2d 1184, 1189 (4th Cir. 1988).
1993]
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The Fourth Circuit next considered the defendant's contention that
the CCE count violated his constitutional protection against double jeop-
ardy. The court began by stating that double jeopardy does not present a
rigid, clear bar to certain kinds of prosecutions. Rather, governmental
interest in effective prosecutions is an important factor in double jeopardy
law and has contributed to the creation of various exceptions to general
rules in the area. The Fourth Circuit noted that the government has a
strong interest in prosecuting repeat offenders under the CCE statute and
similar provisions.
The Fourth Circuit then examined pertinent precedent and recognized
the existence of two lines of double jeopardy cases. The first line of cases,
upon which the defendant primarily relied, includes cases wherein the
government based charges for multiple offenses on a single course of
criminal conduct. For example, in Brown v. Ohio396 the defendant faced
prosecution for auto theft and joyriding based on a single incident of
taking a car and driving it. 317 In Grady v. Corbin398 a New York trial
court fined the defendant for two misdemeanor traffic violations and later
indicted the defendant for manslaughter because he killed another motorist
in a traffic accident. 399 The United States Supreme Court held in both
Brown and Grady that the government's charging violated the Double
Jeopardy Clause.40
The second line of cases includes those in which the prosecutions
focused on multilayered conduct. These cases include United States v.
Felix4& ' and Garrett v. United States.40 2 In Felix, the United States Supreme
Court held that subsequent prosecutions for a conspiracy and an overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 4° While the Felix Court based its decision on the traditional
concept that conspiracies and underlying crimes are separate offenses, the
Felix Court stated in dicta that the rule in Brown does n6t apply to
multilayered conduct cases./ The Garrett Court held that subsequent
prosecutions for a CCE offense and a predicate act did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause because essential evidence supporting the second
prosecution did not develop until after the first prosecution. 40 5 As in Felix,
396. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
397. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 162 (1977).
398. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
399. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 511, 513 (1990).
400. See id. at 521 (holding that Fifth Amendment barred prosecution for manslaughter
because manslaughter case would necessarily include proof of conduct for which government
already had prosecuted defendant); Brown, 432 U.S. at 169-70 (holding that conviction for
joyriding, lesser included offense, barred prosecution for auto theft based on same incident).
401. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
402. 471 U.S. 773, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 927 (1985).
403. United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1379-80 (1992).
404. Id. at 1385.
405. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 791 (1985).
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the Court in Garrett suggested in dicta that the Brown rule does not apply
to multilayered conduct cases. 406
In the Fourth Circuit's McHan analysis, the legal test that courts
should apply to determine whether there is a double jeopardy violation in
a particular case depends on whether that case more closely resembles
Brown and Grady or Felix and Garrett. Refusing to view the rules of
Brown and Grady as absolutes, the Fourth Circuit stated that the rules in
those cases apply only to similar "single course of action" cases. In cases
involving multilayered conduct, courts must apply a different legal test to
determine whether proceeding to trial on the charging document would
violate the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit based this decision on
the dicta in Garrett and Felix which suggest that the analysis of Brown is
not a useful tool in cases of multilayered conduct.
In multilayered conduct cases, the Fourth Circuit concluded, the
government is permitted to prosecute the defendant for both a predicate
offense and a multilayered crime provided that the offenses meet the two-
prong test of Garrett. The Garrett test requires that the government prove
that the legislature intended for the two offenses to be separate criminal
offenses that are punishable cumulatively. The Garrett test also requires
that the offenses do not have identical elements.
40 7
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the case at bar clearly involved
multilayered conduct because the government based the CCE charge on
conspiracies that occurred years apart. The court then applied the Garrett
test. The Fourth Circuit relied entirely on the decision of the Garrett case
to conclude that Congress intended CCE offenses to be separate from the
predicate offenses. Turning to the question of identical elements, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the CCE and the embedded conspiracy did
not have identical elements because the government would need to prove
more than one conspiracy to support a CCE charge. The Fourth Circuit,
therefore, upheld the district court's decision to deny McHan's motion to
dismiss the CCE count.
Circuit Judge Hall wrote a brief concurrence. He expressed distaste
for the manner in which the government handled the aborted plea agree-
ment with the defendant. Judge Hall stated that the government should
not demand the release of property by a prisoner's loved ones as a
condition of a plea agreement, even if the government has a legitimate
forfeiture claim to the property.
The McHan decision is a natural outgrowth of a trend in the Supreme
Court's reasoning manifested in Felix and Garrett, but the Fourth Circuit
went a step farther than existing Supreme Court precedent. Felix and
Garrett certainly suggest that the Brown analysis is not applicable in cases
406. See id. at 789 (suggesting that Brown analysis is not useful tool in multilayered conduct
cases).
407. See id. at 786 (setting out test for whether successive prosecutions in multilayered
conduct cases violate Double Jeopardy Clause).
1993]
